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http://google.internal endpoint allows Google Cloud resources to securely retrieve identity and authorization information without embedding secrets. To prevent SSRF attacks, requests must include the Metadata-Flavor: Google
email – The service account email.aliases – Alternative names (e.g., default).identity – OpenID Connect (OIDC) tokens.scopes – The OAuth2 scopes granted to the instance.token – The most critical: OAuth2 access token for Google APIs.In traditional cloud setups, you might download a JSON private key file and store it on the VM. That key becomes a liability: if the VM is compromised, the key is stolen. http://google
When you fetch the URL http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts, you'll receive a JSON response containing information about the service accounts associated with the instance. The response might look something like this: email – The service account email
Going Above and Beyond: Downloading ALL the Buckets * Fetches an access token through the vulnerable Cloud Run app, * Lists the av... blog.ctis.me Soluciona problemas de acceso del servidor de metadatos How this eliminates secret management In traditional cloud
Zero typed the malicious payload into their terminal:
To help me tailor the implementation, are you building this as a legitimate backend service for a cloud application, or are you developing security monitoring/testing tools? View and query VM metadata | Compute Engine
gcloud auth application-default login.169.254.169.254 for AWS IMDSv2).The specific path /instance/service-accounts/ is where your VM goes to find out who it is.